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Government Attorneys and the
Ethical Rules:
Good Souls in Limbo
Maureen A. Sanders*
I.

INTRODUCTION

During the last two decades reported decisions addressing
the propriety of the actions of government attorneys have
occurred with greater frequency than in the past. The decisions
have occurred both within lawsuits in which a government
attorney represents a party and within disciplinary proceedings
against a government attorney. The increase is due, not to an
increase in inappropriate behavior by public sector attorneys,
but to the ever increasing complexity of their functions 1 and to
the evolution of the ethical rules applicable to attorneys. 2 The
current ethical rules of the fifty states are unsatisfactory when
applied to government attorneys because they mandate certain
behavior while failing to take into account the constitutional
and statutory powers and duties imposed upon government
attorneys. This failure results in a lack of meaningful ethical
guidelines for government attorneys. Government attorneys are
often compelled to operate in clouds of uncertainty because the
ethical rules fail to relate professional ethical responsibilities to
the substantive law related to governmental operations.
Consequently, government lawyers must at times disregard the

* Maureen A. Sanders is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of
New Mexico School of Law. She previously served in the New Mexico Attorney
General's office as the Director of the Civil Division and as General Counsel to the
State Corporation Commission. She is grateful to her research assistants who
helped in the gathering of the research for this article and to the financial
assistance of the friends and alumni of the University who made possible a
summer research grant.
1.
Joseph Lesser, The Changing Role of the Public Sector Lawyer-An
Historical Overview, 11 URBAN, STATE & LOCAL LAW NEWSLETTER at 9 (1988).
2.
Len Biernat, Corporate Practice: From the Model Code to the Model Rules to
the States, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 27 (1989).
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technicalities and the underlying rationale of the ethical rules
to accommodate the requirements imposed by law. 3
This article will point out the problems for government
attorneys existent with the current rules by focusing on the
states' attorneys general. The difficulties for attorneys general
and their staff are encountered by every government lawyer.
We will begin by examining the powers and duties of the
states' attorneys general and then use that examination to
point out the ambiguities and inherent conflicts of the existing
ethics rules when they are applied to the attorneys general and
their assistants. Finally, proposals for changes in the ethical
rules will be offered and discussed.

II. POWERS AND DUTIES OF
STATES' ATTORNEYS GENERAL
Every state and territory has an attorney general or
similar official. 4 How an individual becomes attorney general
differs among them. Forty-two of the attorneys general are
elected. 5 Eight are appointed by governors, 6 one by a state
legislature 7 and one by a state supreme court. 8
The powers and duties of the attorneys general vary
considerably from state to state. The variances arise from ( 1)
the sources of the powers and duties, (2) the beneficiaries of the
duties, and (3) the functions falling within the mandated or
allowed powers and duties. The route to the office of the
attorney general in some cases impacts the view an attorney
general or the courts has as to the powers and duties
encompassed by the position. 9 The powers and duties of a state
attorney general may be imposed by the state constitution or
statutes, or a combination of the two. 10 Additionally, many

8.
Ann Bradford Stevens, Can the State Attorney General Represent Two
Agencies Opposed in Litigation? 2 GEO. J. LEUAL ETHICS 7n7 (1989).
4.
William C. Hallett, Jr., Tice v. Department of Transportation: A Declining
Role for the Attorney Gmeral? 68 N.C. L. REV. 10fi1 (198fi).
5.
Letter from Lynne Ross, Deputy Director, National Association of Attorneys
General (March 18, 1987) (on file with the author). The statistics include the
Attorneys General of the territories as well as the states.
6.
Id. The ten are: Alaska, American Samoa, Guam, Hawaii, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands and
Wyoming.
7.
Id. The state is Tennessee.
8.
Id. The state is Maine.
9.
See text accompanying notes 74 to 77.
At least twenty-four states have constitutional provisions which describe
10.
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state courts have decided that the state attorney general has
common law powers to protect the public interest. 11 These
common law powers have been discussed as including the
authority to institute and litigate all suits and proceedings as
the attorney general "deems necessary for the enforcement of
the laws of the state, the preservation of order, and the
protection of public rights and interest." 12 In those states
recognizing common law powers of the attorney general, the
courts have tended to find that the attorney general has certain
inherent powers 13 and have allowed the attorney general a
great degree of latitude in exercising those powers as long as
the attorney general did not abuse them by acting arbitrarily
or capriciously. 14 Other courts have taken the position that an
attorney general's power is strictly circumscribed by the state
constitution and statutes. 15 At least one court has held that
the attorney general powers enumerated in the constitution are
exclusive and cannot be enlarged or restricted by the
legislature except in the manner authorized by the
constitution. 16
, The actual functions of the state attorneys general which
are mandated or allowed by the law also vary considerably.
They may include representation in litigation, the giving of
opinions, general advising, criminal prosecutions, appellate
advocacy or membership on various boards with other public
officials. In some instances the functions may be exclusively the
attorney general's and in others it may be shared with other
public officials or is delegable.

some of the duties of their respective attorneys general. See NATIONAL Ass'N OF
ATT'vS GEN., COMMITTEE ON THE OFF. OF ATT'v GEN., THE STRUCTURE OF STATE
LEGAL SERVICES (1976).
11.
See NATIONAL Ass'N OF ATT'vS GEN., COMMON LAW POWERS OF STATE
ATTORNEYS GENERAL 22-23 (1977); see also Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd., fi6R
S.W.2d 738 (Tex. 1978).
12.
Pierce v. Superior Court, 37 P.2d 4fi3, 461 (Cal. 19a4).
See, e.p., State v. Thomas, 297 P.2d 624 (Ariz. 19fi6) (court recognized that
13.
if attorney general had common law powers, attorney general would have duty to
represent state whenever state had right to sue). In Fergus v. Russell, 110 N.E.
130 (Ill. 191fi), the Illinois Supreme Court held that the General Assembly had no
power to divest the attorney general of the common law powers inherent in the
office because they were constitutionally vested. John W. Freels, Powers of the
Attorney General of Illinois, 53 CHICAGO BAR RECORD 119, 123-24 (1971).
14.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Khorey, 555 A.2d 100 (Pa. 1989).
See, e.g., State v. Bron, 537 N.E.2d fi84 (Ind. 1989) and State ex rel
15.
Haskell v. Huston, 97 P. 982 (Okl. 1908).
Garcia v. Laughlin, 285 S.W.2d 191, 194 (Tex. 19fi6).
16.
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The intended beneficiaries of the powers and duties of the
attorneys general also vary considerably. They may include
state executive officers, departments and agencies, judicial
officers and agencies, county officers and agencies, municipal
officers and agencies, district attorneys, state legislators and
the general public. Some of the statutory and constitutional
provisions are not particularly clear as to whom the attorney
general owes duties. For example, a statute may provide that
the attorney general is the chief legal advisor for the state with
little or no additional delineation of dutiesY No mention is
made as to which part of the state bureaucracy advice is to be
given, and uncertainties arise as to the identity of the client for
government attorneys. 18 Is the client a particular official, a
particular agency/ 9 a particular branch of government, 20 or
the state as a whole? 21 Other statutes provide that the
attorney general should initiate and defend those matters in
the public interest, 22 however, no guidance is provided as to
who determines what is in the "public interest." "It is not
obvious, however, that the 'public interest' would always
dictate one course over another."23
All of the attorneys general have some responsibility to
represent state agencies and officials. Additional duties of the
attorneys general are scattered throughout state constitutions
and statutes. The attached table gives an overview of some of
the more important functions of the attorneys general by state.
An examination of the table will reveal the range of duties of

17.
See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Hancock v. Paxton, 516 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1974).
18.
Keith W. Donahoe, The Model Rules and the Government Lawyer. A Sword
or Shield? A Response to the D.C. Bar Special Committee on Govemmrnt Lawyers
and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 2 GEO. J. LEUAL ETHICS 9R7 (19R9).
19.
The District of Columbia Bar Association issued a committee report
suggesting that the employing agency should be considered the lawyer's client. Bar
Group ldentifirs Agency as Goverment Lawyer's C:lient, 4 Laws. Man. on Prof.
Conduct (ABNBNA) No. 20 at 350 (Oct. 26, 1988).
20.
Ward v. Superior Court., 138 Cal. Rptr. 532 (1977) (finding that the county,
not the official is client).
21.
See Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers' Ethics in a System of Checks
and Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1293 (1987).
22.
See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 8-5-2J (1991) (attorney general shall "appear
before local, state and federal courts and regulatory officers, agencies and bodies,
to represent and to be heard on behalf of the state when, in his judgment, the
public interest of the state requires such action or when requested to do so by the
governor; . . . .").
23.
FTC v. American Nat'l Cellular, 86R F.2d ~H5, ~H9 (9th Cir. 19H9).
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the attorneys general as well as the lack of consistency among
the states as to the expectations for their attorneys general.
Although a lack of consistency exists among the states, one
general observation can be made. The states' attorneys general
are obligated to offer their services to several individual
entities or interests pursuant to the states' constitutions or
statutes.
These obligations arise by virtue of holding the office, not
by choosing whether or not to accept a particular client. 24 This
method of "obtaining clients" is foreign to private sector
attorneys. 25 The basis for the duties imposed upon private
sector attorneys by disciplinary board ethical rules implicitly
rely upon the contractual agreement reached between the
attorney and the client. 26
No such voluntary assumption of obligations occur for the
attorney general or the assistants on a case by case or client by
client basis. While it could be said that the voluntary
assumption of the attorney obligations occurs at the time one
seeks election or accepts a job, neither the scope nor the subject
matter of the representations is known at that time. The ability
to withdraw from representation is an avenue not always open
to an attorney general because of the statutory mandate that
the attorney general represent, for example, a particular state
agency. 27
This disparity between the attorney-client relationships of
a government attorney and those of a private sector attorney is
one largely ignored by the drafters of the ethical rules
applicable to attorneys. 28 While lip service to the distinction
has been made in comments to the rules, 29 the failure to

Ward v. Superior Court, 138 Cal. Rptr. 532 (1977).
Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers' Ethics in a System of Checks and
Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1293 (1987).
26.
For example, as to whether a client-lawyer relationship exists: "Most of the
duties flowing from the client-lawyer relationship attach only after the client has
requested the lawyer to render legal services and the lawyer has agreed to do so."
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope cmt. 3 (West 1992).
27.
Cf. People ex rel. Deukmejian v. Brown, 172 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1981) (statute
provided attorney general right to withdraw from representation of his statutory
clients and to permit them to engage private counsel).
28.
The fact that no government attorney was included in the group of drafters
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct may be one cause of the oversight. See
Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 677, 693-95 (1989).
29.
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 cmt. 7 (West
1992).
24.
25.
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recognize the distinction within the rules themselves is the
source of many of the uncertainties regarding the behavior of
government attorneys. The majority of the questions about
government attorneys' behavior arise in what is generally
viewed as a duty of loyalty owed by an attorney to a client.
They generally arise amidst allegations that a government
attorney has impermissible conflicts of interest or has violated
client confidences.
Ill.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS DILEMMAS OF
GOVERNMENT ATTORNEYS

The conflict of interests dilemmas for attorneys general
usually arise in four contexts: 1) disputes between two agencies
or officials, 2) dual roles within one agency represented by an
attorney general, 3) criminal investigation or prosecution of
public officials, and 4) disagreement between an attorney
general and another public official as to the appropriateness or
legality of a particular action. 30
· The first situation occurs when two state agencies or
officials both represented by the office of the attorney general
are involved in a controversy in which they have conflicting
views. The second situation occurs when a quasi-judicial body,
like a public utility commission, and its staff, which advocates
a position before the quasi-judicial body, are both entities of the
state represented by the attorney general's office. The third
situation which presents a conflict of interest question to state
attorneys general occurs where a public official, represented in
his official capacity by the attorney general, becomes the target
of an attorney general criminal investigation or the subject of a
grand jury proceeding. The fourth situation occurs when the
attorney general concludes that the legal position which an
agency or official wants advocated is contrary to that held by
the attorney general or that a state statute is
unconstitutional. 31

30.
See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, STATE ATTORNEYS
GENERAL: POWERS AND DUTIES (Lynne M. Ross ed., 1988).
31.
Another conflict situation may arise when an attorney general is both a
member and legal counsel to a board. The problems arising in this context will not
specifically be addressed in this article because they are similar to those in the
private sector when an attorney sits on a board and is the legal counsel for the
board. One difference, however, may exist because the attorney general may be
required by statute to wear both hats without the option to remove one of them.
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The courts have repeatedly addressed these questions but
have not answered with one voice. In reaching their conclusions
the courts have considered the inherent power of the courts to
preserve the adversarial nature of the matters before them, 32
the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory ,mandates for the
attorneys general and, either directly or indirectly, the relevant
ethical mandates for attorneys practicing in their states. 33 The
failure of the courts to reach consistent results in similar
situations demonstrates the failure of the ethical rules to
provide workable guidelines to government attorneys.
A.

Disputes Between Two Agencies

The variety of the functions and the intended beneficiaries
of the duties of state attorneys general which are mandated by
statutes and state constitutions means that an attorney general
will inevitably encounter a situation where two state agencies
represented by the attorney general's office disagree in a particular matter. 34 The disagreement may or may not lead to litigation, but the reported cases generally focus on the representation of two agencies or officials involved in litigation. If an
attorney general has two agencies or officials requesting representation, three options are available. The attorney general
may represent both, neither or one.
The ethical rules state that an attorney or a legal office
cannot represent two clients whose interests are adverse.
Courts and ethics committees which have been presented with
a question as to the appropriate course of action for government attorneys confronted with a two-agency conflict have
usually been adamant that their conclusion as to appropriate
behavior is the right one. 35 Unfortunately for government attorneys, the judicial conclusions are not consistent. Some have
said represent both; 36 others proclaim the government attorney

32.
Public Uti!. Comm'n v. Cofer, 7fi4 S.W.2d 121, 124-2fi (Tex. 19R8).
See, e.g., Polkey v. City of New Orleans, fifi7 So. 2d 40fi, 407 (La. Ct. App),
33.
cert. denied, fifi9 So. 2d 1375 (La. 1990).
34.
State ex ret. Allain v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 418 So. 2d 779 (Miss.
1982).
3fi.
See, e.g., City of York v. Pennsylvania Pub. Uti!. Comm'n, 281 A.2d 261
(Commw. Ct. 1971), a{fd, 295 A.2d 82fi (Pa. 1972).
36.
See, e.p., State ex ret. Allain v. Mississippi Pub. Util. Comm'n, 418 So. 2d
779, 784 (Miss. 1982), Arizona State Land Dep't v. McFate, 348 P.2d 912, 91fi-16
(Ariz. 1960).
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can represent neither;37 still others conclude that the government attorney should represent one of the clients. 38
The initial question sometimes addressed by the courts in
these cases is whether the court is being presented with a case
or controversy. Some have found that the existence of "the
state" on both sides of the conflict means that two adversarial
parties do not exist, so the jurisdictional requirement of case or
controversy is lacking. Generally, the response has been that
public officials should have the right to have their legal duties
judicially determined. 39
The ethical conflict when two opposing clients are involved
centers on the notion, "No man can serve two masters."40 The
argument is that an attorney general's office cannot be loyal to
two clients who are in direct conflict. Nonetheless, several
courts have concluded that two masters can in fact be served.
In Connecticut Commission on Special Revenue v. Connecticut Freedom of Information Commission, 41 the appellate court
determined that the Attorney General may represent opposing
state agencies in a dispute. 42 In doing so the court recognized
that the attorney general had to represent the broader interests of the state, not merely two separate agencies. The court
viewed the real client as the people who were entitled to have
the state agencies represented by the constitutionally created
legal officer of the state. 43 In reaching that conclusion the
court rightly recognized that any other decision would lead to
the "absurd conclusion that in the event of any dispute whatsoever between two state agencies, even though that dispute was
not in litigation, the attorney general could not act as legal
advisor and lawyer for either agency because of the conflict
indicated by their dispute."44 The court suggested that concerns
about the appearance of impropriety could be lessened by having the Attorney General himself file an entry on behalf of the

37.
People ex rel. Deukmejian v. Brown, 172 Cal. Rptr. 47H (19H1); ABA Cumm.
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Informal Op. 1282 (197::!).
38.
See State Health Planning & Coordinating Council v. Hyland, 891 A.2d
1247, 1250-51 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (finding that the attorney general
could refuse to represent one agency when already representing another).
39.
See Manchin v. Browning, 296 S.E.2d 909 (W. Va. 1982).
Matthew 6:24.
40.
41.
387 A.2d 588 (Conn. 1978).
ld. at 587.
42.
43.
ld.
44.
ld. at 538.
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state and the assistant attorneys general enter on behalf of the
respective state agencies. 45
Similarly, in Comrrwnwealth Department of Transportation
v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 46 the court recognized that there are situations "which simply require the Attorney General to wear two hats, as it were."47 Some courts
have justified the dual role by relying on the responsibility of
attorneys general to the public or to the public interest. 48 In
doing so, the courts have generally recognized that they are
redefining the identity of the client of a government attorney or
are condoning a violation of the ethical rules regarding conflicts
of interest.
Other courts have taken a more narrow approach and have
determined that the representation by an attorney general of
more than one interest in a case poses an irreconcilable conflict.49 The results in these cases are consistent with the language used in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the
Code of Professional Responsibility. In reaching these decisions
the courts have had to ignore the constitutional and statutory
provisions which mandate representation by the attorney general for the two competing officials or entities. To avoid having
to ignore these laws, at least one court determined that a conflict requiring withdrawal does not exist if the attorney general
opposes an order within the appropriate proceeding when the
attorney general may have to enforce the order in the future.50
A government attorney faced with two agencies in conflict
will find little guidance from court decisions as to the appropriate course of action. The courts have analyzed the dilemma in a
variety of ways with diverse outcomes.

45.
ld. at 538-39.
46.
394 A.2d 61'!3 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978).
47.
ld. (relying on Ault v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 146
A.2d 729 (Super. Ct. 1958), rev'd on other prounds, 157 A.2d 375 (Pa. 1960)).
48.
387 A.2d 533 (Conn. 1978).
49.
Hanna v. Rewkowski, 365 N.Y.S.2d 609 (App. Div. 1975); City of York v.
Pennsylvania Pub. Uti!. Comm'n, 281 A.2d 261 (Commw. Ct. 1971), affd, 295 A.2d
825 (Pa. 1972).
50.
Commonwealth Dep't of Transp. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Uti!. Comm'n, 394
A.2d 683, 61'!6 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978).
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Dual Roles Within One Agency

The second type of conflict of interest involves representation by the attorney general's office of one agency where the
agency or parts of it have two separate functions which, at
least initially, appear to be contradictory. For example, it is not
unusual for a utility commission to have its own staff appear
before it in certain rate cases. The staff is usually presenting a
position contrary to that taken by the regulated industry while
the commission itself is usually performing an adjudicatory
role. The staff may well be represented by an assistant attorney general while the commission is assisted in its quasi-judicial function by the attorney general's office. Thus the same office is representing a party and the decision-maker.
While the courts have been troubled by this arrangement,
they seem to view the situation as unavoidable given the general nature of many state and federal agencies. Those agencies
often have investigative and quasi-judicial functions. 51 The
courts have been reluctant to find an inherent inappropriate
conflict for the attorney general's office and have tended to
analyze the situation within due process notions. 52
In North Fulton Community Hospital, Inc. v. State Health
Planning & Development Agency the court was faced with an
argument that a dual role for an attorney within an administrative hearing is per se prejudicial. 53 The court declined to
make such a finding and determined that a case by case analysis was necessary. The court went on to say the real question
was the fairness of the hearing. It recognized that administrative hearings are not "fitted with all the trappings" of criminal
procedure or civil procedure. The focus of the court's analysis
was whether the other parties and their attorneys had a fair
opportunity to present their case. The advice to the decision
maker had to be made in an "evenhanded manner with due
regard for the procedural rights of all parties."54
A similar question arose when an attorney general's office
represented the public residential ratepayers in a rate hearing

51.
North Fulton Comm. Hosp., Inc. v. State Health Planning & Dev. Agency,
310 S.E.2d 764 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).
52.
ld. at 769.
53.
310 S.E.2d 764 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). See also Schaffer v. State Bd. of Medicine, 237 S.E.2d 510 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977).
North Fulton, 310 S.E.2d at 771.
ii4.
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while assisting the commission hearing the case. 55 In that case
the court recognized that the two individuals from the attorney
general's office assigned to assist the commission functioned
independently of the Attorney General. With no evidence of
control over the commission's attorneys exercised by the Attorney General, the court concluded that a conflict of interest did
not in fact exist. 56 At lead one court has recognized that if the
government attorneys representing two interests or functions
do not act separately and independently of each other, the
court must take appropriate action, including dismissal. 57

C.

Criminal Prosecutions of Public Officials

The third apparent conflict occurs when the attorney general investigates or prosecutes a public official. Attorneys general of most states have duties which involve the handling of
both civil and criminal cases on behalf of the state. 5 8 In pursuing criminal investigations or seeking criminal indictments an
attorney general may be investigating or indicting public officials. Often these public officials are represented by the attorney general when they are acting in their official capacities.
The question then arises as to whether or not the attorney general is able to prosecute or investigate public officials who are
advised in their official capacities by the attorney general without having an unethical conflict of interest.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the question
of whether an unethical conflict of interest existed where the
Attorney General of New Mexico assisted the United States
Attorney in prosecuting two public officials of New Mexico who
had been represented in their official capacities by the office of

fifi.
In re Rates & Charges of Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 6fi::l P.2d fi01
(N.M. 19R2).
56.
!d. at 504.
In re Randy G., 487 N.Y.S.2d 967, 970-71 (Fam. Ct. 1985) (court dismissed
57.
juvenile proceeding because attorneys from corporation counsel's office representing
two interests did not remain separate).
5R.
For example, most attorneys general may initiate local prosecutions in at
least some instances. Only eight states reported that the attorney general may
never initiate prosecutions under any circumstances. NATIONAL Ass'N OF ATT'Ys
GEN., COMMITIEE ON THE OFF. OF ATT'Y GEN., THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION: LOCAL
PRoSECUTION AND THE ATIORNEY GENERAL (1974). See also Pietra v. State, 530
N.Y.S.2d fi10, fi12 (1988) (attorney general is given no general prosecutorial authority and except where specifically permitted by statute has no power to prosecute
criminal actions).
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the attorney general. 59 In reaching its decision that no conflict
of interest existed, the court relied on the district court's conclusion that an inherent conflict of interest does not arise merely because a state attorney general prosecutes a state officer
whom he represented in his official capacity on matters unrelated to the offenses charged. 60
Finding no inherent conflict of interest, the court proceeded
to determine whether an actual conflict of interest existed. The
court determined that no confidential information regarding
the matters contained in the indictment had been communicated by the defendant to anyone in the attorney general's office.
The district court also concluded that the New Mexico statute
required the Attorney General to defend actions against a state
officer only when the cause of action arises while the officer is
acting in his official capacity. The indictment only alleged unlawful personal acts not encompassed by the public officer's
official duties. Thus, the attorney general was not the
defendant's attorney for matters related to the criminal prosecution and was not barred from participating in the prosecution.
A similar result was reached when the governor of Arizona
was the target of a grand jury investigation. 61 The court concluded that the attorney general was not precluded from initiating grand jury proceedings concerning the governor if the
attorney general and the governor had not communicated regarding the matter being investigated. 62 Prior to that decision
the Supreme Court of Arizona had concluded that the attorney
general would violate ethical principles if he presented a case
to the grand jury concerning matters he and the governor had
confidentially discussed. 63

D.

Disagreements as to What is the Public Interest

The fourth type of conflict situation an attorney general
encounters occurs when the attorney general wants to take
some action on behalf of the "public interest." State statutes
often impose a duty upon the attorney general to represent the

59.
United States v. Troutman, 814 F.2d 1428 (lOth Cir. 1987).
60.
!d. at 1438·39.
Mecham v. Superior Court e.x rel. Corbin, Sup. Ct. of Az. No. CV-87-041061.
SA, State Grand Jury Inquiry No. 235, G.J. 73, Nov. 18, 1987.
62.
!d.
63.
Corbin v. Broadman, 433 P.2d 289 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967).
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public interest. The ethical conflict typically arises when a
state official or the legislature has a view different from the
attorney general's as to what is in the public interest. A state
agency director may disagree with the attorney general as to
the advisability of taking a particular appeal. 64 An attorney
general may believe the public interest requires suing a public
official or agency for a violation of the law. 65 The legislature
may pass a statute which the attorney general believes is unconstitutional or generally against the public interest and
therefore the attorney general seeks a declaratory judgment or
refuses to enforce it. 66 Courts faced with these types of conflicts
usually center their analysis on whether the attorney general
has the power, or should have the power, to bring those actions
or make those decisions.
One of the concerns of the courts when an attorney general
rules on the duties to the public interest or public good is the
separation of powers doctrine. 67 The separation of powers doctrine embodies the systems of checks and balances existent in
government on both the federal and state levels. 68 The underlying rationale is the avoidance of undue accumulation of power
in one person. 69 Courts fear that if a state attorney general is
allowed to use the power of the office to control access to the
judicial system in a way that tramples the authority of the
executive or legislative branches, then the protection of the
checks and balances will be lost. 70
In addition to separation of powers concerns, the courts
have addressed the propriety of an attorney general determining what is the public interest. In Manchin u. Browning the
court stated, "The Attorney General's role in this [representative] capacity is not to make public policy in his own right on
behalf of the state.'m The states have complex sets of institutions to analyze and define the public interest. Should one gov-

64.
Feeney v. Commonwealth, 86n N.E.2d 1262 (Mass. 1977).
6fi.
State Bd. v. Bowers, No. 4fi47H (Ga. 19HH).
66.
Fund Manager, Public Safety Personnel Retirement Sys. v. Corbin, 77R P.2d
1244 (Ariz. Ct. App.), affd in part and dismissed in part, on other grounds, 778
P.2d 1260 (Ariz. 1989).
67.
See, e.g., Baxley v. Rutland, 409 F. Supp. 1249, 125fi (M.D. Ala. 1976).
6R.
See Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our Constitutional SchernR: In the Be{;inninf.{ There Was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. fi6l.
69.
Id.
70.
Motor Club v. Department of Transp., 251 N.W.2d 510, fil5-16 (Iowa 1977).
71.
296 S.E.2d 909, 920 (W. Va. 19R2).

t

52

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 7

ernment attorney be able to set their view of the public interest
above the views of other public officials? 72
The courts have answered this question with both affirmative and negative responses. Some have said the office of the
attorney general does not have the power to determine public
interest at least to the extent of accessing the judicial system. 73 Others have said that the attorney general has a right
to refuse to represent a particular position and then allow
private counsel to be selected. 74 Courts have also split on whether attorneys general can seek a declaratory judgment that a
state statute is unconstitutional. 75 A different analysis may be
required when the attomey general is an elected official. In
that event the people have elected a person so that independent judgment regarding the legal affairs of government can be
had. 76
IV.

CONFIDENTIALITY DILEMMAS OF GoVERNMENT
ATTORNEYS

Government attomeys have been criticized for their disclosure of what some would view as confidential information.
Views certainly vary on what is confidential information when
dealing with public entities. 77 The various state sunshine laws
regarding open meetings and public records certainly provide
limits as to what claims of confidentiality may be made. 7R Assuming that at least some information a govemment attomey
may have is confidential, to whom can disclosure be made or,

72.
William Josephson & Russel Pearce, To Whom Does the Government Lawyer
Owe the Duty of Loyalty When Clients Are in Conflict, 29 How. L.J. fi39, fi6fi
(1986).
See, e.g., State ex rel. Amerland v. Hagan, 17fi N.W. 372 (N.D. 1919).
73.
74.
Superintendent of Ins. v. Attorney Gen., fifi8 A.2d 1197 (Me. 1989).
7fi.
Compare Hetherington v. McHale, 311 A.2d 162, 167 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1973) rev'd on other grouncL~. 329 A.2d 2fi0 (Pa. 1974) with Fund Manager, Public
Safety Personnel Retirement Sys. v. Corbin, 778 P.2d 1244 (Ariz. Ct. App.), affd in
part and dismissed in part, on other grounds, 77?. P.2d 1260 (Ariz. 1989); see also
State v. Burning Tree Club, 481 A.2d 7Rfi (Md. Ct. App. 1984); Commonwealth ex
rel. Hancock v. Paxton, 516 S.W.2d 86fi (Ky. Ct. App. 1974).
Eric Schnapper, Legal Ethics and the Government Lawyer, 32 RECORD 649
76.
(1977).
77.
For a general discussion see Jack B. Weinstein & Gary A. Crosthwait,
Some Reflections on Conflicts Between Government Attorneys and c:tients, 1 TOlTRO
L. REV. 1 (Spring 1985).
78.
Ann Bradford Stevens, Can the State Attorney General Represent Two
Agencies Opposed in Litil{atiun? 2 GEO. J. LE()AL ETHICS 7fi7, 776-RO (19?.9).
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alternatively, to whom are duties of disclosure or confidentiality owed?
Courts and committees addressing the issue of disclosure
have encountered problems similar to those struggling with the
conflicts issues. The Federal Bar Association Ethics Committee
has opined that the extent of confidentiality a government
lawyer owes to those consulting him or her varies in degrees
according to the subject matter. 79 Disclosure beyond the agency
or other law enforcing or disciplinary authorities was considered to be
warranted only in the case when the lawyer, as a reasonable
and prudent man, conscious of his professional obligations of
care, confidentiality and responsibility concludes that these
authorities have without good cause failed in the performance
of their own obligation to take remedial measures required in
the public interest. 80

Others have concentrated on the danger of silencing government attorneys regarding wrongdoing in government. "If there
is wrongdoing in government, it must be exposed. The law
officer has a special obligation not to permit a cover-up of illegal activity on the ground that exposure may hurt his party."111 The balancing of the need to keep some things confidential against the duty to expose wrongdoing by public officials is
a difficult task for government attorneys within the loyalty
concepts contained in the current ethical rules.
V.

THE LOYALTY ETHICAL RULES

The current ethical rules applicable to loyalty of government attorneys and courts' applications of them are unsatisfactory. A discussion of the application of them to the typical conflicts and confidentiality questions encountered by attorneys
general will dramatically illustrate their inadequacies.
All fifty states have ethical mandates governing the conduct of attorneys. 82 Generally, loyalty to a client is required to

79.
Federal Bar Assoc., Professional Ethics Corum., Op. 73-1 (1978) (the
goverment client and confidentiality).
RO.
!d.
Rl.
Jack B. Weinstein, Some Ethical u. Political Problems of a Government Attorney, 1H MK L. REV. 1fifi, 160 (1966).
R2.
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MoDERN LEOAL ETHICS § 2 (1986).
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some degree. 83 The mandates include restrictions on
attorneys' behavior regarding conflicts of interests and confidentiality. Although the restrictions vary from state to state,
many incorporate the language of either the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility (hereinafter Code)84 or the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (hereinafter Rules). 85 The
Rules, adopted in 1983 by the American Bar Association, will
be used throughout the following discussion. Similar concerns
arise in those states which use the Code when drafting their
rules.

A. Applicability to Government Attorneys
Traditionally, the courts and disciplinary authorities have
assumed that a state's ethical rules apply to government attorneys.86 Attorneys general and other government attorneys are
required to be licensed to practice law and in some states are
required to be members of the state bar. 87 Thus, adherence to
the rules of the licensing entity such as the state supreme
court or the state bar is a condition of holding the office. The
Rules and their respective official comments specifically discuss
their applicability to government attorneys. 88 Attempts to exempt government attorneys from certain parts of the Rules
have been unsuccessful. 89 Arguments that the ethical mandates
were not applicable to certain situations faced by government
attorneys have often fallen on unsympathetic judicial ears. 90

83.
!d. at § 4.1.
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility was originally adopted by the
84.
American Bar Association in 1969. Subsequently it was adopted in some form by
forty-nine states and influenced California's rule. CHARLES W. WoLFRAM, MoDERN
LEGAL ETHICS § 2.6 (19R6). Some of those states have since adopted the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct were originally adopted in 198~:! by
8fi.
the American Bar Association.
R6.
SeP, e.f!., State ex rel State Bar Ass'n v. Douglas, 416 N.W.2d fi1fi (Neb.
1987), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 4RR U.S. R02 (1988) (government attorney
violated the Code in a criminal case).
87.
See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. V, § 3.
8R.
See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope cmt. 4 (West 1992).
89.
William Josephson & Russel Pearce, To Whom Does the Government Lawyer
Owe the Duty of Loyalty When c:lients Are in Conflict? 29 How. L.J. 539, fi43, 557
nn.1fi & R6 (19R9).
90.
See, e.g., Manchin v. Browning, 296 S.E.2d 909, 920 (W. Va. 19R2) (attorney
general has duty to conform conduct to that prescribed by the rules of professional
conduct).

39]

GOVERNMENT ATTORNEYS AND ETHICS

55

No one advocates that a government attorney should be
free of any ethical mandates. In fact many would say that a
government attorney ought higher standards than those imposed on others because of their special status representing the
state. 91 "A government attorney is required to be more circumspect than a private lawyer, as improper conduct on the part of
a government attorney is more likely to harm the entire system
of government in terms of public trust."92 The ethical standards required of government attorneys should, however, be
applicable to their roles. At the very least the government attorney ought to have guidelines which assist decision-making
rather than ones which cloud the issues by employing concepts
foreign to the role of the government attorney. 93
At times the courts have recognized a selective nonapplicability of the ethical mandates to government attorneys based on
an analysis giving state statutes and constitutions superior
status over ethical rules or on an analysis of the requirements
of separation of powers. 94 In the first instance the courts have
found that the ethical rules conflict to some degree with the
powers and duties imposed by the state constitution or statutes
and have concluded that the former must give way to the latter.95 For example, state law may require the attorney general
to represent state agencies when they are involved in litigation
while the ethical rules may provide that no attorney may advocate a position contrary to a client's interest. If two agencies
are involved as adverse parties in a lawsuit, an attorney

91.
Connecticut Comm'n on Special Revenue v. Connecticut Freedom of Info.
Comm'n, 3H7 A.2d fi33 (Conn. 197H).
92.
Stephen R. Kaye, Conflicts in Representation: An Overview of Developments
Durin!{ 1987 and 1988, Practicing Law Institute (December 12, 198H).
93.
Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics; The Making of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 677 (1989). For a discussion
of similar concerns for those lawyers representing close corporations, see Lawrence
E. Mitchell, Professional Responsibility and the Close Corporation; Toward a Realistic Ethic, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 466 (1989).
94.
For example, in State Bd. v. Bowers, No. 45478 (Ga. 1988) the supreme
court determined that the attorney general was subject to the Code of Professional
Responsibility but that the Code could not be construed to prevent him from taking a legal position adverse to the state, the agencies or public officials when the
action is authorized or required by state law.
95.
Public Util. Comm'n v. Cofer, 754 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. 19HH); cf Krahmer v.
McClafferty, 2H2 A.2d 631, 633 (Del. 1971) ("Ethics super[s]edes any requirement of
a City Charter such as we have here which would seem to require that he or a
member of his staff represent even though there might be a conflict of interest
involved.").
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general's office representing either state agency would, of necessity, have to advocate a position contrary to at least one of
its clients.
The separation of powers doctrine has been employed in
these instances by focusing upon what could be the result of a
violation by an attorney of the ethical rules. If an ethical rule is
violated, disbarment or license revocation is usually an available sanction. 96 If bar membership or a license is a prerequisite to holding the office of attorney general, then removal from
public office could result.
Generally, however, removal procedures for elected public
officials such as the attorney general are set out in the provision in the law establishing the office. 97 It is not unusual for
the procedure to call for an impeachment process in the legislature or a recall process by the voters prior to ousting a state
attorney general. Neither of these methods would be employed
if the licensing authority sought disbarment or de-licensing
based on a violation of an ethical rule. Allowing for what
amounts to a removal from office by methods distinct from the
removal process mandated by law would be an incursion by the
judiciary into the powers of the executive branch. Thus, a violation of the separation of powers doctrine would occur if the
ethical rules were applied to the attorney general in that particular instance. Finding such an incursion unacceptable in the
form of government established in this country, the courts have
refused to strictly apply all the ethical conflict rules to the
attorney general. 9 x If the duty to represent the state agencies is
constitutionally mandated, then the courts should find that the
constitutional mandate prevails over the ethical requirements
under the general notion that constitutional provisions trump
conflicting statutes or judicial rules. 99
The secondary status given ethical mandates is also understandable as a natural result of applying general principles of

96.
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MoDERN LE!:AL ETHICS § :1./i (1986).
97.
See, e.g, Simpson v. Alabama State Bar, :ill So. 2d 807 (Ala. 197/i).
9H.
The Supreme Court of Georgia, at least partly in response to the disciplinary action brought by the Stat<> Bar against the attorney general modified its rules
to provide: "No provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility shall be construed to prohibit [a full time government lawyer] from taking a legal position
adverse to the State, its agencies, or officials, when such action is authorized or
required by the Constitution or statutes of this State." RULES OF THE STATE BAR
OF GEOR<aA Rule 4-102.
ld.
99.
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the hierarchy of law when the ethical mandates have been
adopted as rules of the supreme court while the duties of the
attorney general regarding representation are contained in
state statutes. Generally, in the absence of unconstitutional
overreaching by the legislature, the hierarchy requires statutory provisions to prevail over judicially adopted rules. 100 However, in some states the ethical mandates are contained in
statutes. 101 In those states where the ethics mandates and the
attorney general duties are both statutory, two statutes would
necessarily conflict when an attorney general had a duty to
represent two agencies in a dispute. Usually the rules of statutory construction would require that the specific statute would
prevail over the general statute. 102 In that event the ethical
statute is the more specific of the two and should prevail. Because the attorney would have to take a position adverse to a
client if representation of either agency occurred, the attorney
general would be precluded from representing either client
even though statutorily required to represent both.
The secondary status sometimes given to the ethical mandates can probably be best understood by looking at their history. The attorney ethical rules began on a national level in 1908
as Canons of Professional Ethics. 103 In 1969 the American Bar
Association redrafted the Canons into the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. 104 In 1983 the Model Rules of Professional Conduct were adopted. 105 The evolution into the Rules
involved a transition from trade association principles of "nice
behavior" into a set of rules similar to a set of laws. 106 The
Code had limited enforceability because of the non-mandatory
nature of the language used in the Ethical Considerations. The
principles contained in the Ethical Considerations of the Code
were aspirational in nature. 107 The Rules, on the other hand,
employ language which clearly set the requirements attorneys

100.
See, e.f?., Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 551 P.2d 1354 (NM
1976).
101.
CHARLES W. WoLFRAM, MoDERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.6 (1986).
TABEZ GRIDLEY SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §
102.
51.05 (Dallas C. Sands, 4th ed. 1984 Revision).
Len Biernat, Corporate Practices from the Model (}ode to the Model Rules to
103.
the States, :14 ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 27 (19R9).
104.
Id.
105.
Id.
106.
L. Ray Patterson, An Inquiry into the Nature of Legal Ethics: The Relevance
and Rule of thf' Client, 1 GEn. J. LEt;AL ETHICS 1, 52 (1987).
107.
ld. at 56.
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must follow to avoid sanctions imposed by the appropriate
governing body. These Rules have become part of the ethical
rules of many states. As they become more ingrained in the
minds and hearts of judges and viewed as mandates rather
than aspirational goals, the judges may not be so quick to relegate them to a secondary status as they have in the past. In
that event government attorneys may find themselves facing
disciplinary action rather than judicial determinations in a case
where the government attorney represents a party and it is
alleged that the attorney has acted inappropriately.
B.

Conflict of Interest Rules

The Rules set out lawyers' duties to clients, the legal system and themselves. The Preamble to the Rules presents the
concept that while all lawyers must act in an ethical manner,
some differences may exist as to the duties of attorneys representing states and those representing private individuals. 108
Other differences are also acknowledged between the ethical
obligations for representation of a legal organization or entity
and those for representing individuals. 109 Three of the Model
Rules address conflicts of interest specifically. 110 The goal of
these three rules is to insure that the lawyer's loyalty lies with
his client rather than with himself or another person.

1. Rules dealing with conflicts of interest
Rule 1. 7 is the general conflict of interest rule. 111 It prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if the representation of
that client will be directly adverse to another client. 112 The only
exception to the prohibition applies if the lawyer reasonably
believes the representation will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client and each client consents after
consultation. 113 Rule 1. 7 also prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if the representation may be materially limited by
the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a third person or
by the lawyer's interests. 114 Again, the lawyer is exempted from

lOR.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope cmt. H (West 1992).
ld. 1.13.
ld. at 1.7, l.H & 1.9.
ld. at 1.7.
!d. at 1.7(a).
ld.
!d. at 1. 7(h).
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this prohibition if the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected and the client consents after consultation. 115 Furthermore, if the lawyer is seeking consent from the client to represent multiple interests in a single
matter, the consultation must include an explanation of the
implications, advantages and risks of the common representation.116
Rule 1.8 lists transactions which are prohibited because
they would form the basis for an inappropriate conflict of interest. 117 Many of the prohibited transactions are ones which are
not particularly relevant to an inquiry regarding common conflict of interest questions unique to state attorneys general. 118
One of the prohibitions is, however, endemic to attorneys general conflict questions. The rule prohibits the use of information relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of
the client unless the client consents after consultation. 119
Rule 1.9 is the conflict of interest rule which applies with
respect to former clients. 120 It prohibits a lawyer from representing a person in the same or a substantially related matter
in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the
interests of a former client unless the former client consents
after consultation.m Rule 1.9 also prohibits a lawyer from
using information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client except as Rule 1.6 regarding confidentiality allows or when the information has become generally
known. 122

2.

Conflict of interest dilemmas for government attorneys

The ethical rules relating to conflicts of interest presuppose
an ability of the attorney to decline to take on some individuals
or entities as clients and to identify who the client is. The inaccuracy of these assumptions when applied to attorneys general
places them in a position of choosing between failing to perform

!d.
116.
!d.
117.
ld. l.H.
11R
These include, for example, prohibitions on business dealings with clients,
on the lawyer being a beneficiary of a will drafted by the lawyer, on literary or
media agreements and on giving financial assistance to a client. Id.
119.
ld. at l.R(b).
120.
ld. at 1.9.
ld. at l.9(a).
121.
122.
ld. at 1.9(b).

11fi.
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an obligation imposed by law or violating, at least in some
eyes, an ethical rule which has been promulgated by the supreme court, legislature or bar association of the state. At its
most extreme the choice is to be guilty of dereliction of duty or
unethical behavior. In other words, lose your job or lose your
license (or perhaps lose both). An examination of the four conflict situations encountered by attorneys general within the
context of the ethical rules will provide background for these
conclusions.

a. Disputes between two agencies or officials. Given the
decentralization of many of the state functions it is not unusual
for two state agencies or other entities represented by the attorney general to find themselves in a dispute that requires
them to seek legal counsel and perhaps to sue each other. 123 If
one takes the view that the agencies or the officials are the
clients of the attorney general, representing both of them would
be a violation of Rule 1.7. That rule prohibits representation of
adverse clients unless the lawyer believes the representation
will not adversely affect the attorney-client relationships and
each client consents to the dual representation. The comments
to the rule provide that it may be appropriate for a government
lawyer in
some circumstances [to] represent government employees in
proceedings in which a government agency is the opposing
party. The propriety of concurrent representation can depend
on the nature of the litigation. For example, a suit charging
fraud entails conflict to a degree not involved in a suit for a
declaratory judgment concerning statutory interpretation. 124

This comment seems, however, to be intended as an explanation of the rule rather than as an exception to it. It seems
that a lawyer would still have to make the determination that
the attorney-client relationship would not be adversely affected
if the dual representation continued. Even if the lawyer believes that the adverse representation is appropriate, the lawyer must obtain the consent of both of the clients for such rep-

12:~.

See, e.!(., State v. Mississippi Pub. Uti!. Comm'n, 41R So. 2d 779 (Miss.
19R2). In those instances where the two agencies are under the control of one state
official, the superior state official could command a resolution and avoid the litigation.
124.
MomcL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.7 cmt. R (West 1992).
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resentation. 125 Both of these requirements are difficult to
meet. 126
The relationship between the attorney general or the assistants and the agencies and officials is often one instilled with
trust and confidence and would be adversely affected if the
attorney engaged in dual representation. Many clients, even in
their official roles, would feel betrayed if "their attorney" represented another with an adverse claim even if the other were an
arm of the state. Additionally, an attorney general representing
both agencies which are in a dispute would certainly at times
have to make statements or take positions which would be
adverse to one of the clients. That action is specifically prohibited by Rule 1. 7. The attorney is also prohibited from using
information relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client consents after consultation. If the attorney general represents either or both, the attorney general would, of necessity, be using information relating to the representation of the client to the disadvantage of a
client (or former client). Few public officials or agencies would
consent to that use. Thus, the attorney general may be viewed
as having violated the duty of loyalty owed to the clients.
If the view is taken that the state agency or the executive
branch of the state or the state itself is the client, then the
attorney general must also analyze the situation in light of
Rule 1.13 which gives guidelines to attorneys having an organization as a client. 127 That rule, which according to the comments is applicable to government entities, 128 provides that a
lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the
organization rather than the persons involved in the organization. Of course every entity must act through its constituents or
representatives. Consequently, a lawyer dealing with a person
related to the entity may learn that an individual is acting or
planning to act in a manner that would violate a legal obligation of the entity or which might be imputed to the organiza-

125.
!d. at 1.7.
126.
In fact some have taken the view that a public agency cannot consent to
such an arrangement. See William Josephson & Russel Pierce, Tu Whom Does the
aovernment Lawyer Owe the Duty of Loyalty When Clients are in Conflict?, 29
How. L.J. li39, li47 n.34 (19R6). In fact New Jersey's conflicts rules provide that a
government agency could never consent to representation by an attorney representing dual interests. !d. at li43 n.16.
127.
MoDEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (West 1992).
12!1.
!d. at 1.13 cmt. 7.
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tion and which is likely to cause substantial injury to the organization. Rule 1.13 provides that the lawyer "shall proceed as is
reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization."129
While the quoted language is rather ambiguous, the Rule
goes on to provide that the lawyer shall consider the seriousness of the violation, the nature of the lawyer's representation,
the apparent motivation of the person involved, and organizational policies. 130 Mter considering these notions, a lawyer can
take measures in a way which will minimize the disruption to
the organization and the risk of revealing information outside
of the organization. 131 Measures could include asking for reconsideration of the matter, suggesting a separate legal opinion be
obtained, or referring the matter to a higher authority in the
organization. The rule does not enlighten attomeys on how to
analyze the hierarchy of an organization. For example, who is
the highest authority in a corporation? Some would say the
shareholders while others view this rule as prohibiting the lawyer from divulging the matter to the shareholders. 132 The extracorporate revelation ban is absolute and thus provides special
protection for corporate officials from disclosure of their wrongdoing.133 Similar, and even more complex, questions arise
when the organization is a govemment one. For example, does
the highest authority analysis involve a look at the organization as the agency, the branch of govemment, or the state? Is
the highest authority the public?
If the lawyer is unable to convince the organization to
pursue a different course and the proposed action is clearly a
violation of law and is likely to result in substantial injury to
the organization, the lawyer is entitled to resign pursuant to
Rule 1.16. In fact the lawyer may be required to resign. 134 Resignation is not always a viable option for govemment attorneys. They may have constitutionally or statutorily imposed

ld. at l.l.':l.
ld.
L. Ray Patterson, An Inquiry into the Nature of Le.Ral Ethics: The RelPvance
and Rule of the Client, 1 GEO. J. LEc;AL ETHICS 43 (19H7).
1::!2.
Len Biernat, Corporate Practice: From the Model C:odP to the Model Rules to
the State:-:, :14 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 27 (19R9).
1.'3;:!.
ld. at 4.'i.
134.
ld. at 40.
129.
180.
l::ll.
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duties of representation. Resignation may be a violation of
those duties. 135
While Rule 1.13 does give some guidance to those having
the organization as a client, it does not provide any guidance to
the government attorney to decipher who the client may be.
The comments to the Rule specifically state that the duty applies to governmental organizations. 136 The comments also
provide that when the client is a governmental organization, a
different balance may be appropriate between confidentiality
requirements and assuring that the wrongful official act is
prevented or rectified. 137 The justification given for the different
balance is that public rather than private business is involved.
The comment rather cavalierly, and unhelpfully for this analysis, further suggests that in some circumstances the client may
be a specific agency but generally the client for a government
attorney is the government as a whole. 138
The ethical rules give no analytical framework for the
attorney who is in the position of viewing the public as the
client. Certainly, the attorney cannot request a vote of the
citizens of the state every time a decision must be made in a
legal dispute. This concern is particularly relevant to states'
attorneys general who have been independently elected by the
citizens. 139 Generally, the citizens view the elected attorney
general as their lawyer with independent powers to pursue the
public good. 140
No matter what view is taken of the identity of the client,
the attorney general runs afoul of an ethical rule when two
agencies are involved in a controversy. Attorneys general could
take the view that they are the ultimate decision-maker as to
the correct legal view. This notion may run afoul of separation
of powers notions where the attorney general, rather than the
judiciary, is deciding legal controversies 141 or where the attorney general, who is not generally viewed as the supreme executive officer, is dictating to the executive branch what course of
action must be followed in a particular transaction. 142 Some
131i.
See Public Utility Comm'n v. Cofer, 754 S.W.2d 121, 123-24 (Tex. 1988).
136.
MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 cmt. 7 (West 1992).
!d.
137.
13R.
!d.
139.
See supra notes 73 - 76 and accompanying text.
140.
See Erik Schnapper, Legal Ethics and the Government Lawyer, 32 RECORD
OF THE Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 649 (1977).
141.
See supra notes 67 - 70 and accompanying text.
142.
William Josephson & Joseph Pierce, To Whom Does the Government Lawyer
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would even contend that the agency attorney who substitutes
his or her own judgment for that of the political process, which
is generally accepted as legitimate, is acting unethically. 143
The second alternative is for the attorney general to represent the side taking the position consistent with the attorney
general's view of the matter. The attorney general will, of necessity, have to take positions materially adverse to the client
it is no longer representing. That action would be a violation of
Rule 1.9.
If the second agency is to obtain private representation,
decisions must be made as to who will be selected, how the
choice of counsel will be made, and who will pay for the representation.144 Often state law requires the selection of any special counsel to be made by the attorney general or at least with
the approval of the attorney general. 145 In those instances the
attorney general would be in the position of hiring or approving
opposing counsel-a strange notion. The degree of supervision
that the attorney general employs over opposing counsel may
be mandated by the statutes and regulations regarding expenditures of public funds.
The use of special counsel also tends to be an inefficient
method of providing services. 146 Even in civil cases the courts
tend to recognize the desirability of having public officers representing public interests 147 since "to allow the numerous state
agencies the liberty to employ private counsel without approval
of the attorney general would invite chaos" into the legal representation of the state. 148
The substantive law of governmental entities is complex.
Many hours would have to be spent by special counsel to "get
up to speed" at a high cost to the state. The further question of
whose budget will be tapped for payment of special counsel
often becomes a source of contention between the unrepresent-

Owe the Duty of Loyalty When Clients are in Conflict?, 29 How. L.J. fi39, fi67
(19R9).
148.
Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers' Ethics in a System of Checks and
Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1293 (19R7).
See City of Tukwila v. Todd, fi68 P.2d 223 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977) (approv144.
ing retention of private counsel when city council has no faith in the city attorney).
State v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 41R So. 2d 779, 7R7 (Miss. 19R2).
14fi.
146.
NATIONAL Ass'N OF A'IT'YS GEN., COMMI'ITEE ON THE OFFICE OF A'IT'y GEN.,
THE STRUCTURE OF STATE LEGAL SERVICES (1976).
McQuesten v. Attorney Gen., 72 N.E. 96.5 (Mass. l901i).
147.
14R.
EPA v. Pollution Control Bd., 372 N.E.2d 50, fi3 (Ill. 1977).
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ed agency and the attorney general's office. 149 If the agency will
be responsible for payment, the financial question may well
result in the attorney general winning by default in times of
limited state budgets.
The third alternative for the attorney general is to represent both agencies in court. 150 While this may seem bizarre to
those practicing in the private sector, it may well be possible to
establish "screens" within the attorney general's office and have
separate assistant attorneys general arguing for the two agencies involved in the dispute. 151 The attorney general is then
able to provide representation to both of his clients or client
constituents. This result requires a certain amount of trust in
the attorney general not to directly or indirectly intimidate the
assistant attorney general taking a position contrary to that
personally held by the attorney general. 152
The final possibility is that the attorney general represents
nobody and special private counsel is appointed for each side of
the dispute by the attorney general or selected by the individual agencies. This final result still provides financial and selection questions and to some degree does not resolve the conflict
problem because presumably the attorney general may well
have the ultimate power to select or discharge private attorneys representing the state. The power to appoint implies the
power to remove, and thus the power to control. 153
In any of these scenarios the attorney general would be
running afoul of an ethical rule if anyone other than the people
or the state or the particular branch of government is considered to be the client. The violations occur because the attorney

14:1.
SPe State Health Planning & Coordinating Council v. Hyland, 891 A.2d
1247 (N.J. 197H).
150.
See, P.f?., Connecticut Comm'n on Special Revenue v. Connecticut Freedom
of Info. Comm'n, 8R7 A.2d 5::!:-l (Conn. 197H).
1fil.
These "screens" have been used in situations where an attorney has
changed employment. Their use in those circumstances allows a firm to continue in
a case even though one of its attorneys has a conflict. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT Rule 1.ll(b).
1fi2.
Public Uti!. Comm'n v. Cofer, 754 S.W.2d 121, 125 (Tex. 19HH) (if attorney
general engages in collusive representation, then a violation of separation of powers
occurs); State v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 418 So. 2d 779 (Miss. 19H2) (allow
assistant attorneys general to represent separate state agencies in a dispute between them unfettered and uninfluenced by the attorney general's opinion).
1fi8.
City of York v. Pennsylvania Pub. Uti!. Comm'n, 281 A.2d 261 (Pa. 1971),
affd, 2:1fi A.2d H2fi (Pa. 1972); see also Janene M. Marasville, Removeability and
the Rule uf Law: The Independence of the Solicitor General, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
7fi0 (l:IH9).
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general's office itself, or the private counsel it supervises, will
be representing a client directly adverse to another client in
violation of Rule 1.7. It could use information relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client in violation of Rule 1.8. Or it will represent another with materially
adverse interests to those of a former client in violation of Rule
1.9.
If the people, the state or the branch containing the feuding officials or agencies is considered to be the client, then the
attorney general may have only one client involved and no
conflict of interest would exist. In that event a court could
decide no case or controversy exists 154 and dismiss the case, or
use its inherent powers to ensure the adversarial process and
prohibit the attorney general from representing both sides of
the controversy. 155
The attorney general may also run afoul of the powers and
duties imposed upon the office by the constitution and statutes
of the state. The attorney general by law often has the exclusive156 ability to represent the state in court or to hire private
counsel for state entities or to provide legal counsel to a particular agency. 157 If the attorney general fails to do so because of
alleged conflict questions, the attorney general may be violating the duty so imposed. 158

1fi4.
Cf State v. Thomas, 766 S.W.2d 217, 223 (Tex. 1989) (Hecht, J., dissenting)
(The court granted writ of mandamus, in an unprecedented case where in an action by the State, represented by the Attorney General, against a stateagency was
also represented by the Attorney General. The result was that state sued itself,
the Attorney General argued against himself, and both the state and the Attorney
General both won and lost.)
1fifi.
Public Uti!. Comm'n v. Cofer, 754 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. 1988). Some courts
have found that a public official possesses the implied authority to employ special
counsel when the legal officer is disqualified as in the case where a dispute exists
between two agencies of a government body. See, e.g., COMMCO v. Amelkin, 46fi
N.E.2d 314 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1984), Zablow v. Incorporated Village of Freeport, 246
N.Y.S.2d 4~i4 (App. Div. 1964).
156.
State v. Mississippi Pub. Util. Comm'n, 418 So. 2d 779, 782 (Miss. 1982).
In Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd., fi68 S.W.2d ns (Tex. 1978), the court
1fi7.
refused to allow the attorney general to sue the Water Quality Board because the
attorney general had the exclusive right tu represent state agencies and it would
be inappropriate for the attorney general to allow the Board to have special counsel.
See, e.g., Connecticut Comm'n on Special Revenue v. Connecticut Freedom
1fi8.
of Info. Comm'n, :3H7 A.2d 533 (Conn. 1978).
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b. Dual roles within an agency. The second type of conflict is that involving the representation of one agency with
several functions. Representing one agency with conflicting
functions is usually analyzed as involving a conflict of interest
for the atton1ey general's office. How can it truly be a conflict
of interest in the traditional sense under the ethical rules because only one client is involved? The conflict really occurs
because of a conflict in roles of the agency, not because two
clients of one law office have conflicting interests. Of course,
this analysis only applies if one takes the view that the agency
rather than certain individuals or departments within the
agency is the client. A traditional conflict of interest would
exist if the different individuals were viewed as the clients
because attorneys from the same office would be representing
parties with conflicting interests. The application of the ethical
rules under that view would be the same as that used under
the two agency analysis.
If, however, the view is taken that the agency is the client
and the client has two functions, one of which is investigative
and one of which is adjudicative, the attomey general's office is
only representing one client. Under that view the only ethical
concem would be the prohibition against an attomey taking a
position adverse to the client. Rule 1.13 would be useful in this
context. Because the entity would be considered the client, the
lawyer would not be taking positions adverse to the client if the
highest authority within the client determined what position
should be taken ultimately. The use by the courts of due process analysis rather than conflict of interest analysis is appropriate if the agency is viewed as the client.

c. Investigation of or prosecution of public officials. The
attorney general's prosecution of a public official brings into
play both the general conflict of interest rule and the former
client conflict of interest rule. The general conflict of interest
rule 159 prohibits an attorney from representing a client if the
representation will be directly adverse to another client' 60 or if
the representation of that client may be materially limited by

159.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (West 1992).
160.
An exception exists when the lawyer reasonably believes the representation
will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client and each client con·
sent~. after consultation. !d. at 1. 7(a).
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the lawyer's responsibilities to another. 161 The rule addressing
the conflict of interest in regard to a former client prohibits a
lawyer from representing a person in the same or a substantially related matter when that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of a former client. 162 The rule also prohibits a lawyer from using information related to the
representation of a former client to the disadvantage of a former client. 163
These two rules of professional responsibility are implicated when a state attorney general criminally prosecutes a state
official who has been or is represented in his official capacity
by the attorney general's office. An argument could be made
that the prosecutor in a criminal case is representing a client
(the state) in a matter where the representation will be directly
adverse to another client (the public official). Furthermore, in
certain instances, the public official being prosecuted could
claim that the prosecutor is representing the state in a matter
substantially related to a matter in which the prosecutor represented the public official or is using information related to the
previous representation of the public official to the disadvantage of the public official.
The argument for prohibiting the attorney general from
prosecuting public officials has appeal at first blush but suffers
from a lack of reality. Accepting the argument as valid would
preclude attorneys general from the prosecution of any case of
malfeasance of a state official who happened to be represented
in his official capacity by the attorney general's office. Many
attorneys general have a specific statutory duty to prosecute
crimes involving public officials. To adopt a per se conflict rule
prohibiting all prosecutions of individuals the attorney
general's office represents in an official capacity would unnecessarily tie the hands of the attorney general. The approach taken by the courts in Troutman 164 and Mecham 165 makes sense.

161.
An exception is made if the lawyer reasonably believes the representation
will not be adversely affected and the client consents after consultation. ld. at
1.7(b).
162.
An exception exists if the former client consents after consultation. ld. at
1.9(b).
163.
An exception exists if the information can be used pursuant to Rule 1.6 or
if the information has become generally known. ld. at 1.9(c)(1).
164.
United States v. Troutman 814 F.2d 1428 (lOth Cir. 1987).
165.
Mecham v. Superior Court ex rel. Corbin, Sup. Ct. of Az. No. CV-87-0410SA, State Grand Jury Inquiry No. 235, G.J. n, Nov. 18, 1987.
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Those courts detennined that no actual conflict existed when
the attorney general prosecuted a government official previously represented in his official capacity by the attorney general's
office if no confidential communications related to the criminal
prosection had occurred.
If the identity of the attorney general's client is other than
the public official, then no conflict of interest concern should be
raised. For purposes of Rules 1.7, 1.8 and 1.9 the public official
never was a client of the attorney general, so the attorney
general would not be taking a position adverse to a client or a
former client by criminally prosecuting the public official. Additionally, Rule 1.13 would allow the attorney general to take
steps, including disclosure within the entity client in some
instances, when a person involved with the entity violates the
law in a way which may be imputed to the entity. 166 If the
client is the state or the people or the public interest, the prosecution may well fall within the bounds authorized in Rule
1.13.

d. Disagreements as to what the public interest is. The
conflicts of interest raised by the attorney general's representation of the public interest are as problematic when analysis is
attempted using the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility
as is in the two agency conflicts. In fact they are very similar.
On one side of the dispute the attorney general represents the
public interest as the attorney general perceives it to be. On
the other side of the dispute is a public official or agency with
views differing from those of the attorney general. Thus, two
clients, or a client and a former client, are in dispute. The attorneys general and the courts must engage in the same balancing of the constitutional, statutory and ethical mandates as
discussed above regarding two agency conflicts.
One important distinction can be made, however. Often in
situations where the attorney general is litigating in the public
interest, the attorney general is an actual party to the litigation and is not viewed as representing a client. Most of the
ethical conflict rules don't really address that issue because
they focus on representing a client with adverse interests. Rule
1.8(b) does prohibit a lawyer from using "infonnation relating
to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client

166.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.18 (West 1992).
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unless the client consents after consultation." 167 Rule 1.9(b)
prohibits a lawyer from using "information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client except as
Rule 1.6 would permit with respect to a client or when the
information has become generally known." 168 If the agency or
public official who is now in a dispute with the attorney general is viewed as a client or a former client of the attorney general, then the attorney general could not generally use the information related to the representation of that client to the disadvantage of the client.
An attorney general may, however, be able to rely on Rule
1.6(b)(2) as justification for using the information to the disadvantage of the client. Rule 1.6(b)(2) allows a lawyer to divulge
the information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary "to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client." 169
While this rule is generally seen to apply to fee disputes and
legal malpractice suits, its language does not preclude a broader use. For example, suppose an attorney general of a state
were obliged to enforce an open meetings law. Assume further
that the attorney general's office discovered through the office's
representation of an agency 170 that the agency violated the open
meetings law. That information would be information related to
the representation of the agency and release of the information
would be disadvantageous to the agency. Under Rule 1.8(b) the
attorney general would be unable to use the information without client consent. However, if the attorney general were to sue
the agency to enforce the open meetings law, then the attorney
general could use the information pursuant to Rule 1.6(b)(2) to
establish a claim on behalf of the attorney general in the controversy with the agency.
The identity of the client question poses the same dilemmas to the government lawyer in the "public interest" conflict
area as in the others. Analysis of each type of conflict exemplifies the unhelpful nature of the Rules regarding conflicts when
they are applied to government attorneys in a wholesale fash-

167.
ld. at lJ!(b).
Id. at 1.9(b).
168.
169.
ld. at 1.6(b)(2).
For purposes of this example, the agency will be viewed as the client of the
170.
attorney general.
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ion. Similar lack of guidelines await the government lawyer in
the area of confidentiality requirements.

C.

Confidentiality Rules

The duty of confidentiality is at the core of the concept of
loyalty to the client. Rule 1.6 provides that information regarding the representation of a client shall not be revealed unless
the client consents. 171 However, the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation if disclosure is impliedly
authorized to carry out the representation. 172 Additionally, the
lawyer may reveal information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary
( 1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act
that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death
or substantial bodily harm; OR
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer
in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the
lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved,
or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the
lawyer's representation of the client .... 173

The identity of the client dilemma impacts the confidentiality duties of govemment lawyers as well as the avoidance of
conflicts of interests obligations. If the client is viewed as the
people or the public interest, then presumably all citizens
would have a right to all information in the hands of a government attomey. In fact a govemment attorney may have aresponsibility to inform the "client" of all information relevant to
a particular matter. If the state is viewed as the client, then all
branches of govemment would be entitled to the information. If
the agency or public official is viewed as the client, then the
lawyer's duties of confidentiality are very restrictive.
The real problem in the area of confidentiality and the
goverrment lawyer is to what extent the govemment lawyer
can be or should be a whistle-blower. 174 If the information
known by a lawyer involves an intent to commit a future crime

171.
172.
173.
174.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (West 1992).
ld. at 1.6(a).
ld. at 1.6(b).
See Roger C. Cranton, The Lawyer as Whistleblower: Confidentiality and the
Government Lawyer, fi GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 291 (1991).
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which will likely result in imminent death or substantial bodily
harm, then under Rule 1.6(b)(2) the lawyer may reveal it. Most
information held by a government lawyer does not fall into that
category. Usually the information involves behavior that will
cause harm to the public interest or the financial status of the
state. Rule 1.6 does not seem to allow divulging of that information. Rule 1.13 would only allow disclosure to higher authorities within the entity viewed as the client. These rules ignore
federal and state statutes requiring government employees to
disclose certain unlawful actions by public officials. 175 Even
more importantly they impose an obligation of silence on the
lawyer. Many believe, particularly in this post-Watergate society, that wrongdoings by public officials ought not be covered
up by attorneys. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct seem
to prevent a government lawyer from responding to those concerns.
VI.

PROPOSED RULES

Rules other than those promulgated by the American Bar
Association have been drafted by groups attempting to devise
standards more appropriate for government attorneys. Unfortunately they have never been seriously considered by the ABA
in drafting its rules and have never been adopted by the state
judiciary or legislatures. The ABA has had a "super-legislature"
status where ethical rules are concerned. 176 In some instances
that deference to the ABA may be appropriate, because it is the
lawyer organization with the greatest membership and has
employed a very involved process in developing its rules. The
ABA has been traditionally lacking in government attorney
membership, however. In the past it has refused to include
within its rules amendments offered by various government
attorneys. Its members have denounced attempts by government attorneys to obtain exceptions for themselves under the
Rules. 177

ld.
Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Makin!( of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 677 (19R9).
177.
The ABA House of Delegates condemned the Department of Justice position
that prosecutors can contact individuals represented by counsel without the permission of their attorney. While this author may disagree with the Department's position, it ought not to be dismissed outright as a clear violation of the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct. The Rules fail to delineate appropriate bounds of activity
when a prosecutor may be acting as an investigator. It certainly doesn't seem to

17fi.
176.
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Recently the ABA has made efforts at incorporating government attorneys into its fold. Perhaps if its efforts are successful, increased sensitivity to the realities daily encountered
by government attorneys would result. Working through the
ABA processes may be the only way government attorneys can
obtain ethical guidelines relevant for their roles. It is with the
hope of beginning the needed serious dialogue that the following amendments to the existing Model Rules of Professional
Conduct are made.

A.

Confidentiality of Information
RULE 1.6 Confidentiality of Information
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to
representation of a client unless the client consents after
consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as
stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal
act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; OR
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the
lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the
client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil
claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which
the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in
any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of
the client; or
(3) to prevent a public official or public agency
from committing a criminal or illegal act that a government lawyer believes is likely to result in harm to the
public good; or
( 4) to remedy substantial adverse effects on the
public good which the government lawyer believes was
caused by a criminal or illegal act of a public official or
public agency; or
(5) when otherwise required by law.

The proposed changes to Rule 1.6 found in (b)(3) would
allow a government lawyer to divulge information to prevent

be an "act of sheer governmental arrogance" as indicated by one delegate. Jerry E.
Norton, Ethics and the Attorney General, 74 JUDICATURE 203, 207 (Dec. 1991).
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an illegal or criminal act in the future by a public official or
agency. The government lawyer would have to believe that the
act is likely to result in harm to the public good before divulging the information.
The changes contained in (b)(4) would allow a government
lawyer to reveal information of a past criminal or illegal act of
a public official or agency in more limited circumstances. For
past acts the information could only be divulged to remedy
substantial adverse effects on the public good.
Section (b)(5) is intended to release the government lawyer
from confidentiality restraints when the lawyer has an obligation under state or federal statutes to disclose certain information. A definition of government lawyer would need to be drafted. It could include those employed on a full time basis as well
as lawyers representing a government agency or official in an
official capacity on a case by case basis.
The proposed rule is not intended to include an attorney
representing a public official who is a defendant in a criminal
proceeding. The rule is intended to allow disclosures, not to
mandate them. Thus, the government attorney can decide what
is appropriate disclosure, if any, in a particular situation.
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Conflict of Interest Rules

1.

The general rule

75

RULE 1.7 Conflict of Interest: General Rule
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation
of that client will be directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation
will not adversely affect the relationship with the other
client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation
of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the
lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation
will not be adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the
implications of the common representation and the advantages and risks involved.
(c) A government attorney shall not be in violation of this
Rule when a government attorney represents more than one
client or interest in a particular matter if the government
attorney believes in good faith that such dual representation is
required or allowed by relevant constitutional or legislative
provisions.

The proposed addition to Rule 1.7 is intended to provide a
safe harbor to government attorneys acting in a manner consistent with the applicable law regarding the attorney's powers
and duties. The language suggested is a bit amorphous because
of the variety of the sources and types of powers and duties of
the government attorneys. If the proposed addition were made,
a court faced with a claim of conflict of interest by a government attorney would analyze the relevant substantive law to
determine whether the dual representation is allowed without
resorting to the ethical rules. If the court finds that the law
allows dual representation, then the government attorney
would have an easy time showing the required good faith belief
in any disciplinary proceeding. If a court determined that the
relevant law did not allow dual representation, the government
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attorney could still carry the burden of showing the basis of a
good faith belief that dual representation was allowed and
avoid disciplinary sanctions. The use of the good faith belief
standard allows the government attorney to be wrong but ethical.

2. Prohibited transactions
RULE 1.8 Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions
(b) A lawyer shall not use information relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the
client consents after consultation. This subsection shall not
apply to government lawyers engaging in dual representation
in a particular matter pursuant to the conflict of interest exception in Rule I. 7(c).

The additional language proposed for Rule 1.8(b) is intended to allow a government lawyer to use adverse information
against a client when the government lawyer (or the office of
the lawyer) is representing both parties in an adversarial situation.

3. Former client
RULE 1.9 Conflict of Interest: Former Client
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a
matter shall not thereafter:
(a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the
former client consents after consultation except as allowed in
Rule 1. 7(c); or
(b) use information relating to the representation to the
disadvantage of the former client except as rule 1.6 would
permit with respect to a client or when the information has
become generally known.

The change to Rule 1.9(a) is necessary to bring forward the
exception to the conflict of interest rule for government attorneys to those situations involving former clients. No change to
Rule 1.9(b) would be necessary because the proposed changes to
Rule 1.6 would also apply to information regarding former clients of the government attorney.
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The Government as a Client
RULE 1.13 Organization as Client
(f) If a government lawyer knows that an officer, employee or other person associated with the government is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter
related to the lawyer's representation that is a violation of a
legal obligation to the government or the public, or a violation
of law which reasonably might be imputed to the government,
the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best
interest of the government or the public. In determining how to
proceed, the lawyer shall give due consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its consequences, the scope and nature of the lawyer's representation, governmental policies concerning such matters, governmental chain of command, and
any other relevant consideration. Any measures taken shall be
designed to minimize disruption of the governmental
functions. Such measures may included among others:
( 1) asking for reconsideration of the matter;
(2) referring the matter to a higher authority in the
government, including, if warranted by the seriousness of
the matter, referral to the highest government official
that can act in behalf of the government on the particular
matter as determined by applicable law even if the highest authority is not within the agency or department the
attorney generally represents; and
(3) advising that a separate legal opinion on the
matter be sought and considered; and
(4) divulging of information to persons outside the
government pursuant to the limitations provided in Rule

1.6.

The addition of subsection (f) to Rule 1.13 is necessary to
give government attorneys guidelines similar to those providing
representation to other organizations. It contemplates that the
attorney will act in furtherance of the governmental and public
interest. It makes it clear that the attorney can go outside the
agency he or she generally represents if that is where the highest authority on the matter is. The amendment avoids the
problem of having to identify which organization is the client
because it does not unilaterally prohibit disclosure of the intended act outside the agency which many previously viewed as
the client organization. The amendment also incorporates the
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confidentiality standards for government attorneys found in the
proposed amendments to Rule 1.6.
VI. CONCLUSION

It has been said of an organizational structure that if it
handles most of the data better than any other theory, it will
do. 178 The same can be said of ethical rules: if they handle most
of the circumstances lawyers encounter, they will do. The current rules do not provide guidelines for the many circumstances
government lawyers encounter. The proposed rules would hold
government attorneys to high ethical standards and at the
same time give them an opportunity to give due consideration
to the responsibilities imposed upon their offices by the constitutions and statutes.

178.
Speech of Sam Deloria, Director, American Indian Law Center, on file in
author's office.
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